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Imagine that Hospital, a non-profit organization, is considering
different ways of dealing with disputes alleging medical malpractice.
Hospital learned that increased transparency in dealing with medical
errors, especially early in the process, can actually lead to a reduction
in filed medical malpractice cases.2 Further, Hospital has had some
success in using the collaborative law model to resolve medical
malpractice claims. Thus far, Hospital has requested that claimants
participate in the collaborative process after a complaint arises, and the
parties only used collaborative law when the claimant agreed. Hospital
has been so successful in using the collaborative law process that it
would like to include a clause in its patient contracts that would require
all patients to use collaborative law prior to going to court.
Now imagine that Mom and Dad recently went through a divorce.
Mom and Dad agree to use the collaborative process, and the process
was extremely successful. Through the collaborative process, the
parties successfully exchanged information, listened to one another, and
created a plan to divide their assets and parent their children. As part of
the agreement, the parents agreed to return to the collaborative process
(hereinafter a "re-CL clause") in the event that they have a dispute under
the agreement or they need to adjust the parenting plan.3
2 See, e.g., Barbara Phillips-Bute, Transparency and Disclosure of Medical Errors:
It's the Right Thing to Do, So Why the Reluctance?, 35 CAMPBELL L. REv. 333,338 (2013)
(describing what patients actually want when a medical error occurs); C. B. Liebman & C.
S. Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of Errors and Adverse Events
to Patients, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRs 4,22-32 (2004) available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/4/22.full (last viewed 1/3/2017) (discussing
how disclosure and information can lead to patient understanding and less malpractice
litigation).
3 Modifications and "re-litigation" of parenting plans is not uncommon when the
original plan is put in place when the children are young. Cases needing modification may
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These examples show two potential situations in which parties may
want to agree to resolve disputes under collaborate law - the "new kid
on the block" of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). In other contexts,
contracts routinely specify how to resolve conflict in the event of a
dispute. Common types of pre-dispute agreements (PDAs) include
arbitration clauses, mediation clauses, negotiation clauses, and some
combinations of these types of processes. Although not well explained
by either courts or scholars, courts appear to have created a continuum
of enforceability when confronted with PDAs. Arbitration agreements
are almost always enforced due to statutory enforcement mechanisms.
Mediation agreements are often enforced, but certainly not uniformly
so, under contract law as a condition precedent to another form of
dispute resolution. Negotiation agreements, on the other hand, are not
often found specifically unenforceable. This article gives some
suggestions for the differing treatment, but ultimately its goal is to
determine where agreements to use collaborative law would fit along
this continuum and whether they should be enforceable at all.
Naturally, some lawyers or their clients may want to take advantage
of the benefits of the collaborative law process by requiring others to
use the process to resolve future disputes. One way to encourage the
use of the collaborative law is to make the process mandatory in a pre-
dispute collaborative law agreement (PDCLA). The collaborative law
process, however, has important distinctions from other types of PDAs.
Most notably, the collaborative process requires both parties to employ
lawyers, and the process may be lengthy and expensive. Although
mediation and arbitration both require the parties to expend costs
(notably for the arbitrator or mediator), requiring the parties to purchase
legal counsel is a difference in both kind and magnitude. In addition,
the collaborative law process requires that the parties and the lawyers
abide by certain collaborative principles, which may not be appropriate
or ethical in every given situation. This article, therefore, recommends
that the collaborative law process be truly voluntary (i.e., not
mandatory) and not enforced over the objection of any party. This
article makes an exception, however, for parties who have already
not signal a failure of the original plan. In many situations, parenting time and financial
obligations that were appropriate when the children are young may no longer be
appropriate when the children are in their teen years.
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engaged in the collaborative process and wish to enforce a re-CL clause
to resolve future disputes arising under a collaborative settlement.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I details the history of
collaborative law, the process, and the unique ethical guidelines
necessary for the process. Part II examines other types of PDAs,
concluding that the courts have effectively instituted a continuum upon
which they treat different types of PDAs. In light of Parts I and II, Part
III considers in detail the consequences (both negative and positive) of
enforcing PDCLAs, ultimately concluding that PDCLAs should not be
enforced over party objection.
I. THE COLLABORATIVE LAW PROCESS
Collaborative law (CL) is a process that "provides for an advance
agreement entered into by the parties and the lawyers in their individual
capacities, under which the lawyers commit to terminate their
representations in the event the settlement process is unsuccessful and
the matter proceeds to litigation." 4 A brief description of the history,
logistics, and ethics of collaborative process will help put this article's
proposal in perspective. Although the collaborative process is only
roughly twenty-five years old, accepted norms of collaborative practice
- bolstered by the creation of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act -have
emerged.5 In addition to discussing collaborative law, this section also
discusses cooperative law,6 which is a variation on collaborative law
that may be useful, especially in cases in which one or more parties
cannot afford to hire counsel.
A. History of Collaborative Law
4 In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Ct. App. Tx. 2010) (quoting Stephanie Smith &
Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 123, 166 (2009)).
' Nancy Ver Steegh, The Uniform Collaborative Law Act and Intimate Partner
Violence: A Roadmap for Collaborative (and Mon-Collaborative) Lawyers, 38 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 699, 705 (2009) ("It appears that although collaborative practices share some
common traits, there are varying models of practice.").
6 In this article, the abbreviation "CL" will refer exclusively to collaborative law.
References to cooperative law will always be spelled in the long form.
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The invention of collaborative law is attributed to Minnesota lawyer
Stuart (Stu) Webb. In roughly 1990, Mr. Webb started a "family law
settlement" practice, which he envisioned as a negotiation-only type of
representation aimed at settlement of family cases.7 Mr. Webb became
disillusioned by the litigation process, particularly the way the process
failed families going through a divorce.8 Mr. Webb wanted to continue
to work with divorcing clients, but he wanted to limit that practice to
resolving the disputes out of court and with collaboration. After some
experimentation, he determined that if he were settlement-only counsel,
then he could work with clients to settle their cases without the
oppressive overtones of litigation lurking in the background. 9 One
aspect of Mr. Webb's process that set it apart from other legal practice
was its limited scope. If the negotiation portion of the process did not
result in a settlement, Mr. Webb would withdraw as counsel and refer
the parties to "trial attorneys."'
0
Mr. Webb realized early on that collaborative law would work best
if the lawyers on both sides were settlement-only counsel. Mr. Webb
sought other family law professionals to offer collaborative, settlement-
only counsel, and he eventually created a practice group of collaborative
attorneys in the Minneapolis area.11 Over time, the number of lawyers
practicing collaborative law grew exponentially, reaching at "least 40
states, all the Canadian providences, Austria, Australia, Ireland,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Britain." 12 As of 2008, Mr. Webb
estimated roughly 8,000 to 9,000 collaborative practitioners
worldwide.' 3 Although collaborative law began in the family law arena,
civil practitioners in other practice areas have also started to use the
7 JOHN BURWELL GARVEY & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, COLLABORATIVE LAW, AND ARBITRATION 195
(2013).
8 Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner's Perspective on Its History and
Current Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 155-56 (2008) (describing himself
as "approaching bum-out").
9 See id. at 156-57 (trying to find a negotiation process that avoided the atmosphere
of being "clouded by litigation.").
'0 Id. at 156.
"1 See id. at 157 (describing the growth of collaborative law).
12 Id.
"3 Id.; see also Patrick Foran, Note, Adoption of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act
in Oregon: The Right Time and the Right Reasons, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 787, 797
(2009) (discussing the expansion of the collaborative law practice).
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collaborative process to resolve disputes in a forthcoming and
economical manner. The efforts to use collaborative law in civil cases,
however, has been slower than proponents of the process would like.
B. The Collaborative Process
At its core, the collaborative law process involves two clients and
two lawyers working together in an open and collaborative manner to
resolve a case through negotiation. 14 The parties and the lawyers must
agree to the process after giving informed consent in writing, and if
collaborative law is unsuccessful, the negotiation counsel must
withdraw and the parties must each retain different trial counsel Along
these lines, the Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA) defines the
"Collaborative law process" as "a procedure intended to resolve a
collaborative matter without intervention by a tribunal in which
persons: (A) sign a collaborative law participation agreement and (B)
are represented by collaborative lawyers."' 15 In practice, the attorneys
and parties usually agree (either in their participation agreement or
implicitly) to use an interest-based negotiation model to try to reach
settlement. 
16
The collaborative process formally commences with a writing,
commonly called the "participation agreement." Under the UCLA, the
participation agreement must 1) be in writing, 2) be signed by the
parties, 3) express an interest to use the collaborative process, 4) set out
the scope of the matter, 5) identify the attorneys representing the parties,
and 6) contain an attestation that lawyers will engage in the
14 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Opn. 07-477, 2 (2007)
("[Alithough there are several models of collaborative practice, all of them share the
same core elements that are set out in a contract between the clients and their lawyers (often
referred to as a 'four-way' agreement.").
15 Uniform Collaborative Law Act § 2(3). Of course, different attorneys may have
different ideas on what interest-based bargaining is and how best to use the process in a
given case. For more information on this point, see John Lande, A Framework for
Advancing Negotiation Theory: Implications From a Study of How Lawyers Reach
Agreement in Pretrial Litigation, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 12-16 & 27-36
(2014) (discussing theoretical and empirical research of the definition of interest-based
bargaining).
16 Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 703.
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collaborative law process. 17 While the parties are engaged in
collaborative law, they agree to forego litigation activity, 18 engage in
cooperative information exchange,' 9 and work together to try to solve
the dispute in a collaborative manner.
Perhaps the defining characteristic of collaborative law is the
disqualification agreement, which is usually included in the
participation agreement. If the collaborative process is unsuccessful,
the collaborative lawyers agree to withdraw, and the parties must retain
new trial counsel to proceed in litigation. 20 The disqualification
agreement serves three distinct purposes. First, the collaborative
process allows the lawyers and parties to concentrate solely on
negotiation, as opposed to preparing simultaneously for negotiation and
litigation.21 Further, the disqualification is a significant economic
motivator. Lawyers will want to stay on the matter and be paid for
further work; clients will not want to hire new lawyers after potentially
spending a significant amount of money on the collaborative process.
22
Thirdly, the disqualification agreement helps preserve confidential
information on the theory that parties will be more likely to exchange
information to their detriment if both sets of counsel will be disqualified
in the event of an unsuccessful process.
23
The collaborative process is a potentially expensive form of dispute
resolution. 24 Both parties, by definition, must retain collaborative
counsel. The process involves preparing for and attending "four-way
meetings," which are joint meetings of both parties, both counsel, and
other necessary consultants. Collaborative law participants often
17 Uniform Collaborative Law Act § 4(a) & §5.
18 Uniform Collaborative Law Act § 9(a).
19Uniform Collaborative Law Act § 12.
20 Uniform Collaborative Law Act § 9.
21 SHERRIE ABNEY, AVOIDING LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO CIVIL COLLABORATIVE LAW
23 (2005).
22 Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 133
(2008) (discussing the economic motivations present in collaborative law).
23 In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) ("Although [plaintiff] does
not contend that she disclosed confidential information to Keen that could be utilized
against her in litigation, the possibility of a client's disclosure of privileged information to
opposing counsel at a "four-way" meeting is not insignificant.").
24 John Lande, An Empirical Analysis of Collaborative Practice, 49 FAM. CT. REV.
257, 17-18 (2011) (discussing empirical research on collaborative law, reporting studies
showing costs of the process from $8,000 to $23,000 per case).
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engage experts and consultants, some of which are jointly retained (such
as financial experts) and some of which are privately retained (such as
conflict coaches and some mental health professionals). In many ways,
collaborative law aims at being a multi-disciplinary approach to
resolving conflict which can lead to significant expenses for the
parties.25
C. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Process
Collaborative law has significant benefits and drawbacks. This
section briefly discusses those pros and cons, particularly in the context
of why parties might consider bargaining for a PDCLA. Primarily,
many lawyers and clients prefer the collaborative process because it
gives parties the ability to settle cases in a way that is collaborative,
based on interests, forthright, and honest.2 6 Collaborative lawyers are
fully dedicated to the process, many of which have experienced
significant benefits for clients and their own practices. Collaborative
law also has the potential to maintain relationships.27 Many of these
benefits are reasons why collaborative law has flourished in the family
law arena. In cases involving long-term relationships and children, the
collaborative process may help reduce parental conflict, which can have
devastating effects on the children.28 In cases involving children, the
parents will necessarily have a continuing relationship. Collaborative
law has the potential to help these parties resolve their dispute
251 d. (noting that the parties purposefully create a process that is expensive to help
ensure that they settle the case).26 See, e.g., Arnold D. Cribari, Collaborative Law: Divorce Lawyer as Peacemaker,
33 WESTCHESTER B.J. 53, 53 (2006) (discussing collaborative lawyers as peacemakers);
Elizabeth K. Strickland, Comment, Putting "Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job
Description: Why More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV.
979, 984 (2006) (discussing how collaborative parties and lawyers forsake the adversarial
way in favor of an interest-based model).
27 Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, Problem Solving Process: Peacemakers and the
Law: The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 45, 49 (2004)
(discussing relationship benefits of the collaborative law process).
2 Diana M. Comes, Note, Meet Me in the Middle: The Time is Ripe for Tennessee to
Adopt the Uniform Collaborative Law Act, 41 U. MEM. L. REv. 551, 558 (2011) ("In the
context of family law.., some commentators state that collaborative law creates optimal
post-divorce relationships. . . [Clollaborative law is designed to promote positive
interactions between divorcing spouses, or at least not create more hostility, animosity, and
conflict between them.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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peacefully so they can continue to work together as parents going into
the future.
In addition, collaborative law is highly likely to result in a
settlement.2 9 Collaborative law practice groups boast success rates in
upwards of 90% of the collaborative cases. 30 Certainly, a tremendous
amount of economic incentives exists in favor of resolving the cases
during the process. The parties and lawyers must do a substantial
amount of work to meet the goals of the collaborative process, including
finding and disclosing relevant information, preparing for and attending
four-way meetings, meeting with experts, and the like. If the
collaborative process ends in impasse, the clients will be financially
responsible for paying for all the services used to that point as well as
paying for a new lawyer and getting that lawyer up to speed. 31 In other
words, collaborative law takes advantage of the "sunk cost" theory of
behavioral economics 32 to encourage the parties to stay on the path
towards settlement.
On the other hand, the collaborative process may be very expensive,
especially if the parties fail to reach settlement. The parties are required
to hire lawyers, and many collaborative professionals require the use of
additional professionals, such as financial experts and mental health
practitioners. If the participants decide to utilize a mediator or
facilitator for the four-way meetings, the cost of the third-party is an
additional expense. The parties who take advantage of collaborative
law are usually the "wealthiest segment of American families," and
minority populations "are not well served by the collaborative process"
29 Settlement rate, of course, is only one measure of success. In his empirical analysis,
Professor Lande noted that participants generally had a positive experience in collaborative
law, but they did have varying complaints, such as inexperienced professionals, lack of
commitment by the other party, time, and cost. Lande, supra note 24, at 18-19.
" Christine A. Lustgarten & Morgen Keen Hecht, Preventing Long Term Post-
Divorce Conflict: A 10-Year Study of Collaborative Divorce in Nebraska, THE NEBRASKA
LAWYER 23-24 (Jan/Feb 2017) (discussing statistics of CL cases in Nebraska).
31 Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law, 21 OHI-o
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 73, 76 (2005) ("While withdrawing collaborative lawyers still
facilitate the transfer of representation to new counsel, clients must bear the increased
costs-both financial and emotional-of bringing in new lawyers.").
32 DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 271 (2d
ed. 2012) (describing the concept of sunk costs and how it can affect mediation
negotiation).
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because they disproportionately have lower incomes.33 Although the
actual costs of using the collaborative law process varies by case,
locality, and complexity, reports show that the collaborative law process
may cost between $4,000 on the low end and $17,000 on the high end.34
Compared to pro se proceedings, collaborative law is considered quite
costly.35 On the other hand, compared to full litigation - complete with
contested discovery, hearings, and a trial - the collaborative process
may save money due to voluntary disclosures and shared experts. 36 The
truest comparison, however, may be between collaborative law and
represented litigants who settle short of trial. How the numbers
compare in those categories does not appear to have received much
empirical analysis.
The collaborative law process is also quite cumbersome. Four-way
meetings require the in-person participation of the lawyers and the
clients. Scheduling meetings can become quite difficult and the
inefficiencies of the process may cause the case to linger on longer than
using traditional dispute resolution or court processes. Those
inefficiencies are even greater when the collaborative team includes
third parties, such as facilitators and experts.
33 J. Herbie DiFonzo, A Vision for Collaborative Practice: The Final Report of the
Hofstra Collaborative Law Conference, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 569, 604 (2009); see also
Lustgarten & Hecht, supra note 30, at 23 (noting that 30% of the cases studied involved
marital estates surpassing $400,000, and an additional 50% of the cases involved marital
estates between $100,000 and $400,000).
31 See Lustgarten & Hecht, supra note 30, at 24 (detailing the costs for the
collaborative process in Nebraska); see also Elizabeth F. Beyer, A Pragmatic Look at
Mediation and Collaborative Law as Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 SAINT
MARY's L.J. 303, 327 (2008) (reporting the $17,600 number); William H. Schwab,
Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL.
L.J. 351, 377 (2004) (noting that survey respondents reported a cost ranging from $1,200
to $20,000 for a collaborative law divorce, saving an average of $8,777 compared to
litigated cases).
35 J. Herbie DiFonzo, From Dispute Resolution to Peacemaking: A Review of
"Collaborative Divorce Handbook-Helping Families Without Going to Court" by Forrest
S. Mosten, 44 FAM. L. Q. 95, 103 n.50 (2010) (noting how the alleged cost savings
determination is difficult to quantify especially compared to the cost for parties to proceed
in litigation pro se).
36 Dafna Lavi, Can the Leopard Change His Spots?! Reflections on the 'Collaborative
Law'Revolution and Collaborative Advocacy, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 61, 71-72
(2011) (discussing the potential cost savings of collaborative law).
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In sum, the collaborative process is an innovative way to resolve
disputes, and it is wonderfully successful in many situations to reduce
conflict in a lasting way. That said, the downsides of the process,
notably costs and the inability to proceed pro se, make it ill-equipped to
deal with every type of dispute. As discussed in the next section, the
ethical considerations also complicate the situation in determining
whether PDCLAs should be enforceable agreements.
D. Cooperative Law as an Alternative to Collaborative Law
Cooperative law is a variation of collaborative law with
significantly fewer constraints, and significantly fewer ethical
considerations. 31 "Cooperative law is similar to collaborative law
except that it does not use a disqualification agreement., 38 Generally,
the parties and their lawyers agree to work in an interest-based manner
and exchange information without resort to traditional litigation
processes. 39 Without the disqualification agreement, the attorneys can
use the prospect of litigation as leverage in the negotiation process.
40
As it is generally known, "cooperative law agreements mirror
collaborative law agreements in spirit and objective, but lack the
disqualification clause unique to collaborative law agreements."
' 41
Following from this distinction, cooperative lawyers have more
freedom to petition the court for preliminary, interim, or emergency
relief, if necessary.
42
An open question remains whether the cooperative process could
exist with one party who is unrepresented. The definition of cooperative
37 The Colorado Bar Ethics Commission found the collaborative law practice to be
unethical because of the use of the disqualification. Because cooperative law does not rely
on the offending contractual relationship, the Commission stated that "the practice of
Cooperative Law is not per se unethical." Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm'n, Formal Op.
115 (2007).
38 John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss, 42 FAM. CT.
REV. 280, 281 (2004).
3 9 See, e.g, In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 20-21 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (describing a
cooperative law agreement in a divorce case).
0 Lande & Herman, supra note 38, at 281.
41 In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d at 24.
42 See John Lande, Family Lawyering with Planned Early Negotiation, 37 WHITTIER
J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 12, 15 (2015) (noting that cooperative lawyers, unlike
collaborative lawyers, may represent clients "at a hearing for a temporary order, and then
negotiate afterwards").
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law, like collaborative law, appears to involve two lawyers and two
clients who work together towards interest-based negotiation. Some
scholars, however, have described cooperative law as parties who use
the principles of collaborative law (interest-based negotiations with
open communication) without the strict structure of collaborative law -
such as the disqualification agreement and representation.43 Under this
type of scenario, cooperative law may be a vehicle for parties who are
interested in the collaborative process but who cannot afford attorneys
or otherwise buy into the entirety of collaborative law.
E. The Ethics of Collaborative Law
Despite the success and perceived success of collaborative law over
the last few decades, 44 significant questions have arisen regarding the
ethics of the practice. At this time, many of these questions have been
resolved in favor of permitting a collaborative practice. An overview,
however, is still worthwhile and these concepts will be revisited later in
the Article.
At its core, collaborative law is a form of limited scope
representation, which is governed by ethical rules such as the American
Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c). Generally
speaking, a limited scope representation must be "reasonable under the
circumstances" and the parties must give "informed consent., 45 The
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professionalism authored a formal
opinion in 2007 easily determining that collaborative law is a
permissible form of limited-scope representation under Rule 1.2.46
43 Forrest S. Mosten & John Lande, The Uniform Collaborative Law Act's
Contribution to Informed Client Decision Making in Choosing a Dispute Resolution
Process, 38 Hofstra L. R. 611,620 n.34 (2009) (noting benefits of cooperative law practice,
particularly in small communities).
" See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane, The Emerging Phenomenon of Collaborative Family
Law (CFL): A Qualitative Study of CFL Cases 58-59 (2005), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/20051/pdf/2005_l.pdf, Julie Macfarlane,
Experiences of Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative Lawyering
Research Project, 2004 J. DiSP. RESOL. 179 (2004).
45 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1980).
4 ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Opn. 07-477, 3 (2007)
("As explained herein, we agree that collaborative law practice and the provisions of the
four-way agreement represent a permissible limited scope representation under Model
Rule 1.2, with the concomitant duties of competence, diligence, and communication.").
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Certainly, the participation agreement would document informed
consent as to the arrangement, but the lawyer will have to assess
whether participating in collaborative law is, in fact, reasonable under
the circumstances.47 Making this assessment will necessarily involve
sufficient client counseling to determine if the client understands the
process and wants to proceed.48
Whether an individual case is appropriate for collaborative law is a
more complicated question that relies on the assessment of the
individual attorneys after consultation with the parties. Parties or
lawyers who are not committed to the tenets of the collaborative process
should not participate in collaborative law. Participants must be
comfortable with interest-based bargaining and voluntary dissemination
of information, even information that is contrary to that party's side.
Aggressive parties and lawyers who stand on legal technicalities would
not be well suited for this process. Under the UCLA, the collaborative
lawyer has the duty to assess whether the process is appropriate under
the circumstances. 49 In addition, it requires collaborative lawyers to
screen clients for domestic violence or severe power imbalances to
determine if the process could still be successful.
50
Another ethical concern arising from the collaborative law process
was whether the attorneys are sufficiently "zealous" and loyal to the
interests of the parties. The duty of "zealous" advocacy was an ethical
canon under the previous Model Code of Professional Conduct. "
"Zealousness," however, is not in the text of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct other than a brief mention in the Preamble to the
Rules. 52 Instead, the Model Rules incorporated a standard of
"diligence," which provides much fewer problems with respect to
47Peppet supra note 22, at 156-57 (discussing the "informed consent" requirement in
collaborative law).
41 John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen for the
Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed Consent to Use
Collaborative Law, 25 OtIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 347, 352-53 (2010) (setting forth
premise that collaborative lawyers must be thorough in determining informed client
consent).
'9 UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §14. The UCLA also requires that the lawyer
counsel the client on the advantages and disadvantages of the collaborative process to
ensure that the client consents knowingly.
'0 UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §15.
51 . MODEL RULE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Cannon 2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1980).
52 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (AM. BAR ASS'N 2002).
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collaborative law. 53 Yet the question remains - can a lawyer be a
successful advocate and a problem solver at the same time?5 4 Of course,
a client may have a legitimate interest in peaceful dispute resolution,
relationship preservation, peace of mind, and the like. In those cases,
the lawyer's "zealousness" may be characterized as a zealous pursuit of
collaboration.
Given the agreement among all four parties to act collaboratively,
some jurisdictions questioned whether the collaborative arrangement is
a non-waivable conflict of interest. Colorado determined lawyers
signing the participation agreement constituted such a conflict, 55 but to
date, this opinion is the lone outlier. The balance of authority, including
an American Bar Association ethics opinion, found that informed
consent can remedy the conflict.56
A final ethical consideration, discussed in the literature, concerns
the disqualification agreement and the ability for one party to
strategically disqualify the other party's lawyer while disqualifying his
own." Although the disqualification agreement is unusual in that one
party can unilaterally force the other side's lawyer to withdraw,
informed consent should likewise alleviate this ethical concern.
So far, the ethical concerns in the literature have considered
collaborative law arrangements when both parties agree to use the
process after the dispute has arisen. In Section Ill(A)(1) and (2) below,
this Article considers how these ethical concerns may be amplified in a
PDCLA.
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983). The
comment to Rule 1.3 states that a "lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication
to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy on the client's behalf. Id., cmt. 1.
" See generally John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice
of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1315 (2003).
" Colo. Bar Ass'n supra, note 37.
56 ABA supra, note 38 at, 3-4 (finding a conflict of interest, but also finding that the
parties and clients can consent to the arrangement).
" Fairman supra note 31.
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II. THE PDA ENFORCEMENT CONTINUUM
PDAs for ADR processes are ubiquitous.5 8 Mandatory mediation
and arbitration clauses are the most common, but some contracts will
also include a mandatory negotiation requirement. An examination of
judicial authority regarding the enforceability of PDAs unveils a
continuum regarding the court's willingness to enforce them. Given
statutory authority in the area, arbitration agreements are routinely
enforced. Pre-dispute mediation agreements are given some deference
and are occasionally enforced as conditions precedent to another type
of dispute resolution. Pre-dispute negotiation agreements are rarely
enforced or found to be any requirement to access to the judicial forum.
Where collaborative law agreements fit on this continuum is too early
to tell, but this Section draws from those cases and the supporting
literature to give some speculation on their treatment by courts.
A. General Overview
Significant incentives exist for and against drafting PDAs on the
front end of a contractual relationship, and I will not belabor the
arguments here. I have previously discussed the benefits and drawbacks
of these types of agreements, and I will only summarize them for the
purposes of this discussion, which did not previously extend to
collaborative law agreements.
59
Numerous benefits exist for including a PDA in a contract. First,
parties may be able to objectively determine the best method of dispute
resolution for them, free from the emotions that arise when a dispute
arises.60 In other words, PDAs operate as dispute system design at the
micro level, and parties have the ability to construct a beneficial process
before a dispute even arises. Second, alternative processes are generally
" For a good reflection on the last forty years of dispute resolution practice, including
the use of pre-dispute agreements, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the Dream ofADR:
Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 18 Cardozo J.
Confl. Resol. 513 (2017).
19 Kristen M. Blankley, The Ethics and Practice of Drafting Pre-Dispute Resolution
Clauses, 49 CREIGHTON L. REv. 743, 756-66 (2016) (discussing in detail the benefits and
drawbacks of drafting PDAs from the perspective of client counseling).
60 Id.
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considered beneficial towards preserving relationships - at least
compared to court processes. When the parties likely have a continuing
relationship - such as a family, business, employment, or other
relationship - a PDA may help keep the relationship intact, despite the
dispute. 61 Third, the parties might want to draft a PDA to ensure that
their future disputes will be resolved in a timely and cost-effective
manner. Fourth, repeat players might want to ensure consistency over
contracts to ensure that all disputes for a particular employer or
company are resolved in the same way. 62 Fifth, PDAs are a good way
to ensure that disputes are resolved confidentially. The litigation option
is a public process, and a PDA can help ensure that the dispute never
reaches the public eye. 63 In addition to the advantages for the parties,
PDAs have a benefit for the courts in maintaining docket control*6 '
Given these benefits, many organization offer sample PDAs for many
different types of processes.
65
Of course, drawbacks do exist, and many people do not include
PDAs in their contracts - either deliberatively or through ignorance.
First, discussing breach during initial contract negotiations is difficult
and focuses negotiations on the negative.66 Parties are likely overly
optimistic in their estimation of breach, and they may take the chance
that no disputes will arise during the relationship. Second, if the parties
do agree to a PDA, they may want to change their mind because of
remorse or uneven bargaining power after the dispute arises. 67 Third,
PDAs may have the unintended consequence of increasing dispute
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id. at 757-62 (discussing all of these benefits).
6 See, e.g., Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OFHo
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 363, 370 (2011) (describing ADR programs as a means of docket
control); S. Gale Dick, The Surprising Success of Appellate Mediation, 13 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LrriG. 41, (1995) (discussing docket control as a benefit of mediation
programs).
65 See, e.g., American Arbitration Ass'n, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: A
Practical Guide (2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document repository/Drafting%2ODispute%2ORes
olution%20Clauses%20-%20A%2OPractical%20Guide.pdf (giving multiple sample
clauses for use by parties).
6 See Blankley, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 762-66.
67 Id.
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resolution expenses, rather than reducing them, if the parties must
engage in unsuccessful ADR processes in addition to litigation.
68
For collaborative law, these traditional benefits and drawbacks of
PDAs cut in many similar ways. In addition to the benefits of
collaborative law mentioned above, 69 parties may be more likely to
agree to the collaborative process with cool heads at the beginning of a
contractual relationship than they would after a dispute arises. In some
areas, particularly family law and employment law, the relationship
element may be critical, which weighs in favor of agreeing in advance
to a collaborative process. The collaborative law process is confidential
- if not privileged7 - which may be a good reason why some people
are interested in agreeing to collaborate in advance. Companies may
consider collaborative law agreements in their contracts to have a
uniform process that they believe will be advantageous and cost-
effective.
On the other hand, parties may be reluctant to engage in the
collaborative process once a dispute actually occurs. The process is new
and requires considerably more trust than other types of alternative
processes.71 The parties and lawyers must trust that each side is being
truthful in their disclosures, not hiding evidence or resting on
technicalities. Given that collaborative law is a new process, parties
may not be willing to participate in a process they may know little about.
This argument, however, was unsuccessful when mediation was a new
process, and it may hold little weight in regard to the collaborative
process. Finally, the collaborative process is costly in and of itself. If
it is unsuccessful, the process is even more costly.
Parties, then, may be interested in drafting a PDCLA for many of
the same reasons they are currently drafting PDAs for arbitration,
mediation, and negotiation. As discussed in the next section, whether
those agreements will be enforced usually depends on the process
involved. Considerable gray area exists regarding the enforceability of
68 ]d.
69 See supra Section I(C).
70 The UCLA provides for evidentiary privilege for communications made in the
collaborative process. UNF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §17 (2015).
"' See Elana B. Langan, "We Can Work It Out": Using Cooperative Mediation - a
Blend of Collaborative Law and Traditional Mediation - To Resolve Divorce Disputes, 30
Rev. Litig. 245, 288-89 (2011) (discussing some of the difficulties of collaborative law due
to the amount of trust needed to engage in the process).
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PDCLAs, and significant policy considerations weigh against their
enforcement.
B. Enforceability of PDAS
Whether courts enforce PDAs appears to depend on two things.
First, whether statutory authority exists to make such agreements
specifically enforceable - such as with the case of arbitration. The
second factor is much less precise than the first. The second factor
appears to depend on the court's attitude toward the selected process.
Even without statutory authority, courts appear more willing to
accommodate pre-dispute mediation agreements than pre-dispute
negotiation agreements - even though both processes are
extraordinarily similar, and the presence of the mediator may not be a
salient fact. This section considers each these types of agreements in
turn.
1. Arbitration
Federal courts now have more than 90 years of experience in enforcing
pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs).72 The primary purpose of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted in 1925, was to enforce
PDAAs, which prior to that time were not enforced under the doctrine
of executory agreements.73 Specifically, FAA makes a PDAA "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract., 74 The purpose of this law
was to overrule 19th Century hostility towards PDAAs, and now the
Supreme Court has expressed a national, federal policy in favor of
arbitration.75
72 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (1925). The Federal Arbitration Act created a mechanism such
that arbitration agreements can be enforced according to their terms.
7' Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration
Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REV. 711, 719 (2015) ("Congress passed the FAA to make
arbitration agreements specifically enforceable... .
74 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
" See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
("Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.");
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the Federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the
576
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Courts regularly enforce PDAAs in a wide variety of situations,
including pre-dispute agreements in business, consumer, and
employment relationships. Many courts ground their decisions not only
in the FAA but also in the underlying philosophy of parties' freedom of
contract.76 These policies are not limited to federal courts. Indeed,
many states have similar statutes and courts that employ similar
reasoning in arbitration jurisprudence.77 The courts' ability to enforce
PDAAs is not limitless. Courts will refuse to enforce a PDAA if a party
has a valid contractual defense to the arbitration agreement, 78 such as
unconscionability,7 9 fraud,8 ° or waiver.81
Because the FAA is silent on the subject-matter of disputes that are
eligible for arbitration, the courts have enforced arbitration agreements
on a wide variety of types of disputes, including claims arising under
statutory authority.8 2  Currently, the only limitation on the subject
matter of disputes eligible to be arbitrated is if Congress legislates that
states to require ajudicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties
agreed to resolve by arbitration.").
76 See, e.g., Bartenders & Culinary Workers Union, Local 340 v. Howard Johnson
Co., 535 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting how freedom of contract extends to
agreements to arbitrate).
" See Int'l Realty Assocs. v. McAdoo, 99 So. 117, 119 (Fla. 1924) (upholding an
arbitration agreement on the grounds of freedom of contract); Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, Local 286 v. Port of Seattle, 295 P.3d 736, 740 (Wash. 2013) (describing the high
burden to overturn an arbitration award as being respectful towards the parties' freedom to
contract for arbitration).
" 9 U.S.C. § 2 (making contracts to arbitrate enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
79 See generally Hooters of Am. Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (refusing
to enforce an arbitration agreement on the basis of unconscionability because of the one-
sided nature of the agreement and based on unfair arbitration procedures specified in the
contract).
80See, e.g., Linon Imps., Inc. v. Tehnoforestexport, No. 92 CIV.9407 (LAP), at *2
1993 WL 187892 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993) (holding that if fraud could be proven with
respect to the arbitration agreement, then the arbitration agreement could be voided).
81 See, e.g., Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that courts are to decide the issue of waiver of an agreement to arbitrate); Marie
v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that courts are to
determine issues of waiver of arbitration agreements due to inconsistent litigation activity).
82 See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (seminal
case on authority to arbitrate statutory claims in situations in which Congress has not
prohibited arbitration).
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a certain type of dispute cannot be arbitrated.83  Otherwise, courts
routinely enforce PDAAs with almost no limitation on the subject
matter of the dispute or the characteristics of the parties to the dispute
(notably individual or corporate party). In sum, the courts not only
enforce the FAA's mandate and order parties to arbitrate but also
liberally interpret this statutory language.
2. Mediation
Unlike arbitration, no overarching federal or state law requires
courts to enforce pre-dispute mediation agreements (PDMAs). 84 Courts
generally have the ability to order non-voluntary parties to attend
mediation under local court rules or as a result of federal litigation
requiring courts to provide ADR programs.85 The Federal Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 required each jurisdiction to implement
an ADR program. 86 Many of the resulting programs in federal courts
(including bankruptcy courts) rely heavily on mediation programs.87
Court-connected mediation programs, however, are usually invoked in
situations in which the parties do not have a PDMA.
83 See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 534 (2012) (invalidating
a state law prohibiting arbitration of nursing home disputes under the FAA); Lindo v. NCL
(Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1269 (1lth Cir. 2011) ("U.S. statutory claims are
arbitrable, unless Congress has specifically legislated otherwise...").
4 In some specific situations, statutes have instituted mediation requirements to
resolve differences prior to utilizing the court's resources. Some states have requirements
that automobile franchisors and franchisees mediate disputes. See, e.g., Darling's v. Nissan
N. Am., Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60-61 (D. Maine 2000) (discussing mediation
requirements in cases involving a Maine statute requiring mediation in automobile
dealer/franchisee disputes). Many states also require mediation in domestic relations
matters.
85 See, e.g., In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 145 (2002) (holding that the power of
the courts would allow a court to mandate that otherwise non-consenting parties participate
in mediation even when the jurisdiction did not have specific authority to mandate parties
to mediation); 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 6:9
(2016) ("More and more courts look to contract law to assess whether to enforce a pre-
dispute mediation agreement.").
86 28 U.S.C. § 651 (1998).
87 See Kristen M. Blankley & Maureen Weston, UNDERSTANDING ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUInON (forthcoming May 2017) (manuscript at § 5.03[A]) (discussing
court-connected mediation programs and the courts' ability to order parties to attend
mediation).
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Despite the lack of statutory authority, many courts will still enforce
PDMAs, usually under a contract theory. 88 Most often, the court will
consider the enforceability of a PDMA when a contract requires
mediation as a condition precedent before another type of binding
dispute resolution, such as arbitration or litigation. 89  Recently, the
Nevada Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute agreement to mediate is
an enforceable condition precedent to litigation, holding that the parties
were required to "'satisfy the condition precedent necessary to trigger
the right to initiate litigation"' in the courts. 90 In other cases, courts will
enforce PDMAs under the theory that parties are required to exhaust
88 Some legal encyclopedias suggest that mediation agreements are routinely
enforced. See, e.g., 4B JAMES H. WALZER, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS
§ 100:36 (6th ed. 2016) (citing C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 62-66, 68-69) ("Absent an overriding
statute or other authority mandating mediation of disputes or the procedures by which the
mediation is to be conducted, it would appear that a mediation clause in a contract (or even
an independent stand alone mediation agreement), executed pre-dispute, would
nevertheless be enforceable once a dispute arose. This appears true even if an agreement
to mediate is seen simply as an agreement to try to come to an agreement if there is a future
dispute (i.e. mediation does not require either party to resolve the dispute)."); see also Ellen
E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation -
Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 576 n.l 16 (2005) (noting early enforcement of
mediation agreements, but questioning whether such decisions will become the norm).
89See, e.g., HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.
2003) (finding mediation agreement was a condition precedent to enforcing arbitration
agreement); Kemiron Atl., Inc. v. Aguakem Int'l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287,1291 (11 th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the contract at issue had two requirements - first mediation and then
arbitration); DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 335-338 (7th
Cir. 1987) (enforcing agreement that requires mediation as a condition precedent to
arbitration in a contract with an auto dealer); Bill Call Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 830
F. Supp. 1045, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (enforcing PDMA as a condition precedent to
litigation); Interwave Tech. Inc. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. Civ.A.05-398, 2005 WL
3605272, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005) (noting that the court had previously granted a
motion to compel mediation as required in the parties' agreement); Ponce Roofing, Inc. v.
Roumel Corp., 190 F. Supp. 2d 264, 267 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding mediation agreement was
a condition precedent to arbitration). But see Kirschenman v. Superior Court of Contra
Costa Cty., 30 Cal. App. 4th 832, 835-846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no authority to
enforce an oral agreement to mediate); Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Vehicle Review Bd., 788
N.E.2d 187, 192-193 (111. App. Ct. 2003) (refusing to enforce a similar mediation
agreement on the basis that the mediation provision may add additional time and expense
to the overall cost of the litigation, which is at odds with the purposes of ADR).
9 MB Am., Inc. v. AlaskaPac. Leasing Co., 367 P.3d 1286, 1288 (Nev. 2016) (quoting
Tattoo Art, Inc. v. TATInt'l, LLC, 711 F. Supp. 645, 652 (E.D. Va. 2010)).
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their contractual remedies prior to seeking relief from the courts.9 1 Still
in other cases, courts will claim that they do not have subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear a case if the parties have not complied with a
PDMA.92
Courts, however, generally do not have the power to specifically
enforce a PDMA because they do not have statutory or other authority
to do so. 9 3 This concept is in stark contrast with arbitration, because the
FAA and state arbitration statutes specifically give the courts such
power to order parties to arbitrate. The FAA was designed to overturn
legal arguments that an arbitration agreement was an unenforceable
executory contract.94 PDMAs, then, may also be viewed as executory
agreements, although the courts have not explicitly recognized them as
such. For mediation agreements, the courts rely on different procedural
methods to ensure compliance with mediation agreements - they are
dismissing lawsuits and refusing to compel arbitration unless and until
the mediation requirement is met.95
Interestingly, none of the cases to date have discussed the court's
power to specifically enforce a PDMA as it relates to a court's general
91 See, e.g., Stoll v. United Way of Champaign Cty., Ill., Inc., 883 N.E.2d 575, 582
(I11. App. Ct. 2008) (dismissing employee's suit for failure to comply with grievance
procedures in her collectively-bargained employment contract, which includes a mediation
component); Mortimer v. First Mount Vernon Indus. Loan Ass 'n, No. Civ. AMD 03-1051,
2003 WL 23305155, at *1 (D. Md. May 19, 2003) (holding that the court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case until the parties mediate their dispute under the contract).
92 See, e.g., Ziarno v. Gardner Carton & Douglas, LLP, No. Civ.A.03-3880, 2004 WL
838131, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8 2004) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction in a case in
which the parties had not yet completed obligations under a mediation/arbitration
agreement).
9' See, e.g., HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233
n.5 (D. Me. 2002) (finding no authority to compel parties to mediate, but the court was
powerless to compel arbitration until the mediation obligation was fulfilled); Mortimer,
2003 WL 23305155, at *3 (refusing to compel mediation, but also stating that the court
cannot hear the merits of the dispute until the mediation requirement is complete); see also
James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation
About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 125 (2006) (discussing cases with
unconscionable PDMAs that were ultimately not enforced by the courts).
" See generally supra note 73 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Ventre v. Ventre, No. CV00377148S, 2001 WL 100326, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2001) (holding that mediation was a condition precedent to instituting
suit and dismissing action because mediation requirement had not been met); Gould v.
Gould, 523 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing modification of custody
petition because parents did not first engage in mediation).
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power to compel mediation. In cases dealing with PDMAs, the courts
generally decide those cases under contract law, when they could just
order the parties to mediate under their general powers or under a local
court rule. Perhaps it is because the courts have the power to compel
parties to mediate under these powers that they are comfortable
enforcing a PDMA as a condition precedent to another form of dispute
resolution.
Although the theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings are
different, the courts generally come to the same conclusion with respect
to PDMAs as they do with PDAAs - they find such attempts to resolve
disputes outside of the courts laudable and generally find ways to
enforce such efforts.9 6 As with the arbitration cases, the mediation
cases do not turn on the type of dispute or the relationships between the
parties.
PDMAs most often arise in commercial, union, employment,
franchise, and domestic relations contracts. Unlike PDAAs, PDMAs
are not particularly controversial, and scholars generally endorse
them.9 7 Mediation is a consensual process, meaning that all decision-
making authority lies in the hands of the participants and that the neutral
9' See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure agreed upon in the settlement is designed
to reduce the acrimony associated with protracted litigation and to improve the chances of
resolving future advertising disputes.").
" See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High
Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 109 (2002)
(supporting pre-dispute mediation agreements in certain employment contracts); Rhys E.
Burgess, Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect Themselves: The'Efficacy of Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Homes, 17 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 24 (2015)
("Preferably, nursing homes would not request residents to sign pre-dispute ADR clauses.
For those that do, mediation is a promising alternative to arbitration."); Robert Donald
Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable
Arbitration Agreement, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 941, 969 (1996) ("Parties may prefer
to mediate before arbitrating a resolution to a dispute. A pre-dispute clause providing for
both mediation and arbitration [looks like the following]."); Roger S. Haydock, Civil
Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation & Arbitration Now
and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 745, 769 (2000) ("Some parties prefer to
also include a pre-dispute mediation clause, requiring the parties to first attempt to mediate
in good faith a resolution before submitting the dispute to arbitration."); Ariana R.
Levinson, What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 789, 858 (2013) ("For instance, perhaps
mandatory pre-dispute mediation... [is an] alternative worthy of serious consideration"
in employment cases).
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has no ability to impose a decision upon the parties. Parties retain
control over the outcome of the dispute, and they are free to reject
settlement options or discontinue the mediation process entirely. Given
these benefits, it is unsurprising that courts are finding ways to enforce
PDMAs in the absence of statutory authority.
3. Negotiation
In some contracts, parties agree to negotiate prior to engaging in
another type of dispute resolution procedure, such as litigation or
arbitration. Pre-dispute negotiation agreements (PDNAs) - often styled
as a requirement to negotiate in "good faith" - are most often found in
contracts in the following contexts: union and employment contracts,
commercial contracts, partnership agreements, and the like. As with
mediation, no overarching law gives the courts power to compel parties
to negotiate. But unlike mediation, courts do not even have rule-based
authority to order parties to negotiate - the ADR statutes and rules
largely favor mediation, and do not include negotiation as an ADR
option. In rare occasions, positive law may require the parties to make
a good faith effort at negotiations before a court will hear a case.9 8
The treatment of negotiation clauses as conditions precedent to
judicial or arbitral resolution stands in stark contrast to the courts'
treatment of arbitration and mediation clauses. In a small number of
cases, a court will find a negotiation clause to be a valid condition
precedent to another form of dispute resolution. 99 In more cases, courts
fail to fimd a requirement to negotiate or determine that even perfunctory
negotiations will meet the arguable condition precedent.' 00 One court
98 New York, for instance, instituted a good-faith negotiation requirement in cases
dealing with residential foreclosure cases in an attempt to ensure that parties meaningfully
work at settling these cases between homeowners and their lenders. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408
(McKINNEY 2016). See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 136 A.D.3d 1024, 1024
(N.Y.S.2d 2016) (discussing negotiation requirement).
9 See, e.g., White v. Kampner, 641 A.2d 1381, 1385-1386 (Conn. 1994) (vacating an
arbitration award because the parties did not submit to mandatory negotiation prior to the
arbitration and rejecting a defense of waiver). But see Pepe & Hazard v. Jones, 20 Conn.
L. Rptr. 186, 186 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997) (finding no obligation to negotiate despite
language in the contract requiring the parties to "agree" to certain elements in a partnership
break-up).
" See, e.g., Vogt-Nem, Inc. v. M/W Tramper, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding that the parties' refusal to engage in negotiations met the requirement that
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noted that no particular remedy exists for the "failure by either party to
negotiate in good faith," and thus did not enforce that portion of a
contract. 0 1 As with mediation, the courts will not compel parties to
negotiate in accordance with an agreement to do so.102
In still other cases in which negotiations are a condition precedent
to arbitration, some courts have determined that the satisfaction of such
requirement is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.10 3 On this point, the
courts appear more likely to find a lack of jurisdiction in the event of a
mediation pre-requisite than they do a negotiation pre-requisite. The
split in authority on this question of arbitrability is not entirely clear and
extends well beyond the scope of this paper.
The cases do not contain any specific reasoning why courts are
considerably less hospitable to negotiation agreements than they are to
mediation agreements. One can only speculate as to the reasons.
Perhaps the informality and lack of a neutral third party account for the
differences. Negotiation is a flexible process that relies on the joint
undertaking and participation of the parties involved. Like mediation,
they reach a "disagreement" prior to moving on with the dispute resolution process);
McAulay v. Bd of Educ. of City ofN.Y, 76 A.D.2d 779, 779 (N.Y.S. 1980) (holding that a
specific union contract "did not impose as a condition precedent to such agreement the
conduct of negotiations of any specific dimension or duration"); Elec. Switchgear Union
v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 178, 184 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI., Phila. Cty.
1964) (determining that the contract was unclear as to whether preliminary negotiations
were required prior to the institution of arbitration); see generally Da Hua Non-Ferrous
Metals Co., Ltd. v. W.D. Mask Cotton Co., 113 F.3d 1234 (6th Cir. 1997) (table case)
(finding that if the parties could not settle their dispute in "friendly negotiations," they
would still have to arbitrate their claims).
101 Bd of Managers of Paradise Harbor at Piermont Landing Condo. v. Dutch Hill
Realty Corp., 68 A.D.3d 696, 697 (N.Y.S.2d 2009).
102 See, e.g., Park Superintendents' Prof I Ass'n v. Ryan, 745 N.E.2d 618, 626 (111.
App. Ct. 2001) (refusing to order labor/management bargaining under a writ of
mandamus); Belfield Educ. Ass'n v. Belfield Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13, 496 N.W.2d 12, 13
(N.D. 1993) (affirming refusal to grant a writ to require additional negotiations in
labor/management case); Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Ass'n of Cuyahoga
Cty. Teachers of the Trainable Retarded, 351 N.E.2d 777, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) ("A
court is without legal or equitable authority to use its contempt power to compel
negotiations between public employers and public employees for purposes of effecting a
collective bargaining agreement.").
103 See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 124 v. Smart Cabling
Solutions, Inc., 476 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that compliance with a
negotiation agreement as a condition precedent was a matter for the arbitrator to decide
under the doctrine of arbitrability).
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negotiation is a consensual process. Unwilling participants can easily
derail the process, and unlike mediation, there is no third party
safeguard to try to encourage participation. 1 4 Courts, too, may find a
negotiation requirement an empty requirement given the fact that a
negotiation ending in impasse would likely satisfy the requirement. If
a negotiation ending in impasse would satisfy the requirement, then
declaring an impasse at the outset could also be sufficient. Further,
courts generally have rule or statutory authority to mandate mediation
even without party consent, but they do not have this power with respect
to negotiation. If a court could mandate mediation on its own accord
but not negotiation, then a court may be more willing to enforce a
PDMA than a PDNA. With these types of considerations, the different
treatment of negotiation clauses can be explained.
4. 4. Collaborative and Cooperative Law?
The purpose of this section is to describe some of the court reactions
to date toward collaborative and cooperative law. Whether such
agreements should be specifically enforceable are discussed more in the
next Section. To date, few cases have dealt with collaborative or
cooperative law, but the ones that have resulted in mixed treatment
across the country. Like negotiation, courts do not yet have the power
to compel parties to participate in CL under a local rule or statute. In
this way, CL is more similar to negotiation than to mediation. This fact,
too, might explain why the mixed treatment of PDCLAs is currently
more similar to PDNAs than PDMAs.
To date, cases involving collaborative law are few and far between,
and the resulting case law is far from consistent. Most of these cases
come out of New York and Texas. The New York cases have centered
on contract formation and consent. In one case, the court refused to
enforce a disqualification agreement on the grounds that the
"0 Of course, mediations can also end in impasse when parties enter the process
unwilling to participate. The difference, however, is the third-party neutral and that
person's attempt to try to gauge participation and work with the parties to avoid impasse.
Mediators have a host of techniques for moving past impasse that negotiators are less likely
to employ. In addition, mediators have some power in the process in which the parties
may try to appease the mediator and work with the process for some amount of time, rather
than declare impasse before the negotiation even gets underway.
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participation agreement was never signed.1 °5 The court, however, did
not make any statements regarding the enforceability of a properly
executed participation agreement, and the result is unsurprising given
that collaborative law is a contractual process. Similarly, in a different
New York case, the court stated in passing that a court could not
"compel parties to engage in such a process without their consent." 10 6
In Texas, the courts have had several opportunities to determine how to
deal with an alleged breach of a collaborative law agreement. In one
case, the court refused to grant summary judgment based on an alleged
breach.10 7 In another case, a Texas court held that alleging a breach of
a participation agreement would be an impermissible collateral attack
on a court judgment.
1 0 8
Turning to cooperative law, only one published case exists in this
area, also in the Texas courts. A Texas Court of Appeals passed on
whether the state's collaborative law statute applied to a contract for
cooperative law.'0 9 In Mabray, following an unsuccessful cooperative
process, one of the parties moved to disqualify the other party's
attorney."10 On that point, the court did not require disqualification.
11'
One of the parties also wanted to invalidate the entire agreement
because it did not meet the requirements of collaborative law, even
though the parties did not intend for that process to apply. 112 The court
overruled this contention on the basis that the Texas legislature is
105 See, e.g., Mandell v. Mandell, 949 N.Y.S.2d 580, 588 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (refusing to
disqualify counsel when the parties never signed a participation agreement prior to
beginning of the collaborative law process).
'06 Id. at 585. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-72; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.102
(West 2011).
107 Rawls v. Rawls, NO. 01-13-00568-CV, 2015 WL 5076283, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug.
27, 2015) (finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding the breach of a collaborative
law agreement when one party failed to disclose relevant financial information to the
other).
108 Pribyl v. Pribyl, 307 S.W.3d 882, 883-884 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding that claiming
a breach in a collaborative law agreement would be an impermissible collateral attack).
See generally H.K. v. A.K., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (refusing to set aside a
separation agreement on the basis of an alleged breach of a collaborative law agreement).
'09 In re Mabray, 355 S.W. 3d 16, 27 (Tex. App. 2010).
I" ld. at 25-26.
.1 Id. at 32 ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mary's motions
to disqualify Keen and revoke consent to the Agreement. We therefore deny the petition
for writ of mandamus.").112 d. at 2 7.
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broadly in favor of ADR, and the court found "no reason to determine
that it meant to prohibit parties from entering into cooperative law
agreements." 13 The court further stated:
We can see no reason why we should hold that
cooperative law agreements violate public policy in
Texas. Neither the collaborative law statute nor
common law prohibit the practice of cooperative law in
Texas, and Mary has offered no persuasive evidence as
to why cooperative law agreements cannot be negotiated
by parties within Texas's generous ADR ambit. 114
This decision, despite being a split opinion, 115 demonstrates strong
preference for both collaborative and cooperative law, at least in Texas.
Very little can be drawn from this scattered CL and collaborative
law authority. The Texas courts appear to be early supporters of the
collaborative and cooperative processes, and Texas was one of the first
states to adopt a statutory protection for collaborative law. 116 In
addition, a strong collaborative law community exists in Texas.117
Although none of the current legal authority definitively determines
how collaborative law agreements are viewed in the courts, it is
relatively easy to imagine that a minority of courts might consider
collaborative law agreements as a condition precedent to litigation.
Collaborative law shares many of the characteristics of mediation,
including a structured process focused on collaboration, and courts do
not hesitate to find that mediation agreements can be conditions
113 jd.
114 1d. at 29.
115 Judge Evelyn V. Keyes authored a vigorous dissent arguing that the cooperative
law agreement was violative of public policy. Id. at 42 (Keyes, J., dissenting) ("I would
hold that the parties' Agreement violates Texas's collaborative law statute and its public
policy and is void.").
"6 Texas adopted statutory protections for use in collaborative law in 2001. Tex. Faro.
Code §6.603 (2001).
17 The Global Collaborative Law Council, an international association of
collaborative law professionals, "was originally established in 2004 as the Texas
Collaborative Law Council, Inc. by a small group of Texas attorneys committed to
assisting clients in managing conflict and resolving disputes without litigation." Global
Collaborative Law Council, ABouT GCLC, http://www.collaborativelaw.us/about.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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precedent. On the other hand, collaborative law is a negotiation process,
which has not received the same treatment. The normative question of
whether collaborative law agreements should be either specifically
enforced or viewed as a condition precedent is analyzed in the next
section.
III. SHOULD COLLABORATIVE LAW AGREEMENTS BE ENFORCED?
If courts have a continuum of options regarding the treatment of
PDCLAs, how should they be treated? Collaborative law, while
technically a negotiation, has a structure, protocol, and protections
similar to mediation.1 18 Significant legal and policy arguments exist for
and against enforcement of PDCLAs, which are discussed in depth.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the balance of authority weighs
against enforcing PDCLAs, perhaps with an exception for a "re-CL"
clause in a settlement agreement created in CL.
A. Yes, Arguments for Enforcement
Some legal and policy reasons exist to enforce pre-dispute
collaborative law agreements. First, parties have the freedom to
contract for their own dispute resolution process, and contract law might
support enforcing a PDCLA in a similar manner as PDMAs. Second,
the "voluntariness" required for CL could be interpreted in a similar
manner as in mediation, and simple changes in the current regime could
make PDCLAs specifically enforceable. Finally, a PDCLA could be
modified to a pre-dispute cooperative law agreement if the true issue is
financial.
1. Freedom of Contract
One legitimate reason to enforce PDCLAs is to honor the parties'
freedom of contract. As a general matter, "parties may contract as they
wish, and courts will enforce their agreements without passing on their
substance."1 19 As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains, this
118 UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, prefatory note (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) ("Mediation and collaborative law are both
valuable ADR processes that share common characteristics.").
"9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro, note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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freedom "is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to
recognize that individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs
by making legally enforceable promises."'120 Courts also have broad
policies favoring dispute resolution and personal choice in dispute
resolution. 121 The Colorado Supreme Court, for instance, stated that the
"right of parties to contract encompasses the correlative power to agree
to a specific ADR procedure for resolving disputes."'122 The freedom to
contract has been found to encompass more than the freedom of
contracting for arbitration. The Mabray case, discussed in more detail
above, stated: "Texas public policy permits and encourages parties to
enter into agreements to submit disputes to various forms of alternative
dispute resolution. Texas public policy also strongly favors 'preserving
the freedom to contract." 123 Enforcing PDCLAs, then, would advance
the public policy of party choice in resolving their own disputes.
Parties have broad ability to contract for dispute-resolution
procedures when they begin their contractual relationship, and valid
reasons exist as to why parties might want to designate a collaborative
law process. CL results in a high number of settlements, and it gives
'2 Id. See also Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., 155 N.E.2d 372, 377
(Ill. App. Ct. 1958) ("The right of the freedom to contract, also rests deeply in the common-
law."); Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (Minn. 1976) ("[P]ublic policy
requires that freedom of contract remain inviolate except only in cases when the particular
contract violates some principle which is of even greater importance to the general
public.") (citation omitted); Royal Indem. Co. v. Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 515 N.E.2d
5, 7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("Absent some overwhelming public policy such as the concept
of unconscionability, . . . the concept of 'freedom of contract' [is] fundamental to our
society.") (citation omitted); Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680,
685 (W. Va. 2005) ("We begin our analysis with the proposition that the freedom to
contract is a substantial public policy that should not be lightly dismissed.").
121 See, e.g., Pohl v. Pohl, 15 N.E.3d 1006, 1010 (Ind. 2014) ("Indiana encourages
such settlement agreements to 'promote the amicable settlements of dissolution-related
disputes,' on the expectation that 'freedom of contract will ... produce mutually acceptable
accords, to which the parties voluntarily adhere.") (citation omitted); Sanger v. Yellow Cab
Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Mo. 1972) ("The injured party is not required to make a
settlement, and the general rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad
bargain."); Cuciniello v. Cuciniello, 378 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1976) ("In general,
public policy holds competent contracting parties to bargains made by them freely and
voluntarily, and requires the courts to enforce such agreements. The interest of society and
public policy require the utmost freedom of contracts within the law.") (citation omitted).
122 City & Cty. of Denver v. Dist. Court, 939 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Colo. 1997).
123 In re Mabray, 355 S.W.3d 16, 29 (Tex. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
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the parties a chance to work together collaboratively. 124 Courts, too,
favor dispute resolution, both for the private settlement of disputes as
well as for docket control.
An additional argument for the enforceability of PDCLAs is that
they are a condition precedent to another dispute-resolution process -
court or otherwise. This argument has significant traction with regard
to PDMAs, 125 and it might also have traction with PDCLAs. Given the
similarities of collaborative law and mediation - particularly the fact
that both processes are non-adjudicatory, future-oriented, and
potentially based on interests - courts may be comfortable treating
PDCLAs in the same manner as PDMAs. In particular, parties have
little to lose in collaborative law, other than time, money, and energy
(which, of course, should not be understated). Because CL is a
consensual process, the parties are always free to reject settlement
proposals and discontinue the process. Parties can only settle if they
agree to do so, and no outside third-party has the ability to impose a
decision on the parties
2. Switch to Voluntariness Within the Forum, not Necessarily in
Choosing the Forum
Similar to mediation, courts could consider "voluntariness" in CL
to mean voluntary settlements and voluntary continuation of the
process, even if the parties are ordered to begin the process. In other
words, CL could take a cue from mediation 126 and require parties to at
least try the CL process, even if they decide not to participate in the
process for very long. If policy were to shift in this direction, the UCLA
and state statutes would need to be amended, but given the newness of
the process, it is unclear how difficult that change would be from a
practical standpoint.
What we have learned from mediation is that parties will often still
settle cases, even if the parties are mandated to mediate. Most court-
connected mediation programs boast settlement rates near or above
50%. 127 What these studies show is that the processes are often
124 See Lustgarten & Hecht, supra note 30, at 23-24.
125 See supra Section I1(B)(2).
126 See supra Section I1(B)(3).
127 See Barry Edwards, Renovating the Multi-Door Courthouse: Designing Trial
Court Dispute Resolution Systems to Improve Results and Control Costs, 18 HARv.NEGOT.
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successful, even if the parties did not originally choose to participate.
One might expect that parties in mandatory CL would settle at an even
higher rate than those in mandatory mediation. The incentives -
particularly the financial incentives - are potentially significantly higher
in CL, especially if the parties give the process a real effort.
Psychologically, the parties may not be willing to give up costs that they
have sunk into the process, and they may keep the CL process going
even if they otherwise would want to terminate and move on to
litigation.128 If the overall results are successful, then maybe it does not
matter if the parties voluntarily chose to participate in the CL process at
the outset.
3. Cooperative Law is Available ifAttorneys are not Part of the
Process
Finally, if the biggest barriers are the use of CL lawyers and costs,
then perhaps one way to "save" a PDCLA would be to allow parties to
participate pro se and change the label from "collaborative law" to
"cooperative law." The process is still in its infancy and some
experimentation might show that a rigid requirement for attorney
involvement is unnecessary. Provided that everyone who does
participate actually participates in good faith, then it should not matter
whether the process involves lawyers or not. The cooperative law
process is significantly less defined, but the overarching principles are
the same.
Allowing a switch from collaborative law to cooperative law, if one
or more of the parties do not want to hire a lawyer, would significantly
aid access to justice if the CL movement wants to be sympathetic to the
middle- and lower-class participants. Parties could take advantage of
L. REV. 281, 293 (2013) (reporting settlement rates hovering around 50% over the course
of a number of years); Timothy K. Kuhner, Court-Connected Mediation Compared: The
Cases of Argentina and the United States, I I ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 535 (2005)
(finding settlement rates in U.S. district courts averaging just under 50%); Ignazio J.
Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation - "Settling " the Last Frontier ofADR, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
177, 191 (finding a settlement rate above 40% in appellate cases); Roselle L. Wissler, The
Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims
and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 565, 581 (1997) (early study showing
settlement rate of just under 50% in cases in which the parties were mandated to mediate).
128 See FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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the CL process - particularly the openness and interest-based
negotiations. Pro se parties in CL actually could stand to save
significant amounts of money both by not hiring a lawyer and through
non-adversarial information-sharing. This type of accommodation for
parties who cannot afford CL attorneys or otherwise choose to be pro
se would significantly aid access to the process.
Despite these benefits, this Article recommends against
enforcement of PDCLAs. The drawbacks are substantial and even the
modifications suggested in this section would still not ameliorate some
of the biggest ethical concerns - notably the problems of
appropriateness and potential abuse to parties in the process.
B. No, Arguments Against Enforcement
The stronger argument is that PDCLAs should not be enforced in
the absence of party agreement. These arguments can be divided into
two categories - philosophical and practical. On the philosophical side,
early statutory authority does not make PDCLAs specifically
enforceable due to the voluntary nature of the process. Further, not all
cases and lawyers are appropriate for the collaborative process, and
significant difficulties would arise trying to predict those in advance.
For practical concerns, the fee structure for CL may not be ideal;
requiring attorneys is contrary to traditional practice; the costs may be
prohibitive; and parties and attorneys could abuse the process. Put
together, these concerns are significant and tip the balance in favor of
not enforcing PLDCLAs.
1. The Statutory Preservation of True Voluntariness
Preserving the voluntary nature of collaborative law was a
significant concern for the drafters of the UCLA. 129 The legislation
passed to date regarding collaborative law has not only failed to include
a specific performance mechanism but also instructs judges to not
specifically enforce them. In light of the last 90 years of the FAA, the
drafters of the UCLA could have included a provision similar to the
FAA and made PDCLAs specifically enforceable.
129 UF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 1 4(3)(C) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
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Instead, the drafters included the opposite language in the UCLA.
Under Section 5(b), "[a] tribunal may not order a party to participate in
a collaborative law process over that party's objection." 130 The
comment further elaborates:
Section 5 protects a party's right to terminate
participation in a collaborative law process at any time,
with or without reason or cause for any or for no reason.
Subsection (b) emphasizes the voluntary nature of
participation in a collaborative law process by
prohibiting tribunals from ordering a person to
participate in a collaborative law process over that
person's objection. 
131
Almost all of the states enacting the UCLA have also enacted this
provision verbatim or close to verbatim. 132 Only one of the sixteen
adopting jurisdictions, Ohio, has not adopted this language.
In a similar vein, the UCLA also states that the process ends when a
party takes inconsistent action in court:
(d) A collaborative law process terminates:
(2) when a party:
(A) begins a proceeding related to a collaborative
matter without the agreement of all parties; or
(B) in a pending proceeding related to the matter:
130 Id. at §5(b).
1
31 Id. at §5 CMT.
132 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-40-104 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-19-105
(2016); Haw. Stat. §658G-5 (2016); MICH. COMp. LAWS. § 691.1335 (2016); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 7.77.040 (2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.57 (2016); MD. CODE ANN. § 3-2003
(2016); ALA. CODE. §6-6-26.04 (2016); Ariz. R. Faro. L. Pro. § 67.1 (2016); D.C. CODE. §
16-4005 (2016); N.M. R. CIv. PRO. R. 1-128.2 (2016); N.D. St. Ct. R. 8.10 (e)(2) (2016);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23D-6 (2016) ("Participation in a family law process is voluntary
and may not be compelled by a tribunal."); TEX. CODE ANN. §15-102 (b) (2016) ("A
tribunal may not order a party to participate in a collaborative family law practice over that
party's objection.").
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(i) initiates a pleading, motion, order to
show cause, or request for a conference
with the tribunal;
(ii) requests that the proceeding be put on
the [tribunal's active calendar]; or
(iii) takes similar action requiring notice
to be sent to the parties.
33
The Ohio CL statute only has this provision, and not both this one and
the explicit one regarding the courts' inability to enforce a PDCLA.
134
In some respects, both of these provisions accomplish the same action,
and the former may be merely surplusage. The explicit language in
Section 5(b) certainly makes the intent clearer, however.
Both of these provisions require the underlying policy of voluntary
participation in CL. The Prefatory Note to the UCLA lists voluntariness
as the first characteristic of CL: "Collaborative law is a voluntary,
contractually based alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") process for
parties who seek to negotiate a resolution of their matter rather than
having a ruling imposed upon them by a court or arbitrator." 135
Scholars, too, often list "voluntariness" as a key trait of the process. 1
36
To date, the concept of voluntariness in CL is a true voluntariness-
that parties voluntarily agree to participate in the proceeding and
participate as long as they would like. This type of true voluntariness
is different than what is currently considered "voluntary" participation
in mediation. As noted above, 13 7 courts have the ability to order parties
to mediate under local court rules. 138 The mediation is still said to be
133 UCLA §5(d).
134 OIuo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.44 (C) (2016).
' UCLA Prefatory Note (emphasis added).136 See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law,
21 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 73 (2005) (proposing a model rule of professional conduct for
CL that would include the following: "Collaborative law is a form of voluntary conflict
resolution designed to minimize the negative economic, social, and emotional
consequences often associated with the adversarial process."); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative
Dispute Resolution §27.50 (Uniform Collaborative Law Act) (noting that the UCLA
"emphasizes that party participation in collaborative law is voluntary:); Benjamin Angulo
et al., State Legislative Update, 2011 J. DiSP. RESOL. 387, 398 (2011) ("The fundamental
cornerstone of collaborative law is its voluntary nature.").
137 See supra notes 86-85 and accompanying text.
138 Id.
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"voluntary," but only in the regard that any agreement reached is
voluntary and that the parties are free to terminate the process whenever
they like. 139 Given that mandatory mediation has been around-and
largely favorably viewed-for over two decades now, it is significant that
most proponents of CL only favor a truly voluntary process in which
entering CL, staying in CL, and resolving the dispute must all be done
with the consent of all parties.
A rule of true voluntariness makes sense for CL. The process
requires a real commitment from both parties to engage in interest-based
negotiations and to disclose information voluntarily. In the case of a
PLCLA, at the time of signing, the parties may not have understood
fully the commitment to the process and the significant differences-
particularly in advocacy style-between CL and almost every other type
of dispute resolution process. At the beginning of a relationship, parties
rarely contemplate breach, and they may not pay particular attention to
the PLCLA. Of course, the same can be said of any PDA, but the
collaborative process is significantly unlike other types of DR processes
to make enforcement of a PDCLA problematic.
2. Appropriateness
Closely related to voluntariness is the issue of appropriateness,
which is an ethical requirement for CL. Simply put, not all disputes are
appropriate for CL. Appropriateness turns largely on the personalities
involved in the dispute, and less on the merits. Theoretically, any
139 See, e.g., Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the
Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 483-84 (2010) ("Studies show that parties who have entered
mediation reluctantly still benefited from the process even though their participation was
not voluntary. It has been observed that parties probably get 'swept along by [mediation's]
power and forget how they got there initially."') (citation omitted); Alexandria Zylstra,
The Roadfrom Voluntary Mediation to Mandatory Good Faith Requirements: A Road Best
Left Untraveled, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 69, 77-79 (2001) (discussing benefits to
mediation, even when mandated); Dr. lur. Ulrich Boettger, Efficiency Versus Party
Empowerment -Against Good-Faith in Mandatory Mediation, 23 REV. LITIG. 1, 12 (2004)
("Mandatory mediation remains a voluntary process. Its existence does not neglect the
party-empowerment objective completely."); Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR- A
Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 1006 n. 62 (2012) ("Proponents
of Mandatory Mediation argue that while entering the process is mandatory, how the
parties choose to participate once attending mediation is completely voluntary.").
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subject matter could be resolved in a collaborative manner - from
admiralty to zoning, and everything in between. Nothing exists about
the process that makes it better suited for some types of disputes over
others. Although lawyers consider collaborative law best for parties
with continuing relationships-such as family matters 4 0-the process is
content neutral and widely applicable.
The UCLA has a comprehensive rule regarding appropriateness,
requiring the CL lawyer to do the following before signing a
participation agreement with the client: 1) to assess with the client
"whether a collaborative law process is appropriate for the prospective
party's matter"; 2) provide the party with sufficient information for the
party "to make an informed decision about the material benefits and
risks" of CL, particularly in light of other DR options; and 3) advise the
party that they cannot invoke the court process while CL process is
ongoing, that the process in voluntary, and that the CL lawyer cannot
represent the client in court.141 Both the attorney and the client must
agree that the case is appropriate for CL, and the party must give
informed consent. 142 Screening is a complex subject, and
appropriateness may be difficult to determine in advance.1 43 In his
proposed ethical rule governing CL lawyers, the late Professor Fairman
also urged that an "agreement to use collaborative law must be the result
of informed consent, confirmned in writing, with terms that can be
" See, e.g., Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J.
317, 317 (2004) ("Since its emergence in 1990, collaborative law has captured the
enthusiasm and commitment of a rapidly growing segment of the family law bar across the
U.S. and Canada-"); Marsha B. Freeman, Florida Collaborative Family Law: The Good,
The Bad and the (Hopefully) Getting Better, II FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 237,244-45 (2010)
(discussing how CL is beneficial for both divorcing families and the lawyers who regularly
practice CL); Susan Gamache, Collaborative Practice: A New Opportunity to Address
Children's Best Interest in Divorce, 65 LA. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2005) ("Collaborative
Practice has the potential to fulfill children's best interest following separation and divorce.
Interdisciplinary practice groups create a rich pool of resources from which can be drawn
the expertise and process options to help the families resolve the legal, emotional and
financial problems of the separation.").
141 UCLA § 14.
142 UCLA Prefatory Note.
143 John M. Lande & Forrest Steven Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers'Duties to Screen
the Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients' Informed Consent to Use
Collaborative Law, 25 OIO ST. J. DiSp. REsOL. 347, 370-93 (2010) (discussing ethical and
practical aspects of appropriateness in collaborative law).
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reasonably understood by the parties."' 44 Informed consent is important
given the level of trust necessary for CL to succeed.
One common example of a dispute that may not be appropriate for
CL is one in which the parties have a coercive or violent relationship,
due to domestic violence or otherwise. 145 Concern exists that the person
with significant power and control could continue to exercise power and
control over a vulnerable party in the process. 146 Rather than
categorically eliminate these cases, the UCLA puts a duty on the
lawyers to screen the parties and determine if they have a violent or
coercive relationship. 147 If so, CL can still occur if the parties are
willing and the lawyers can ensure the safety of the participants.1 48
Parties with power and control issue may not be limited to family cases.
Cases involving workplace discrimination, Title IX issues, roommate
disputes, and other cases may involve one party with significant power
over the other.
Cases may also be inappropriate for CL due to the parties'
disinterest in following the rules of CL. If the parties do not trust each
other, the CL process will not be effective. For example, if a wife does
not trust that a husband would truthfully disclose all of the financial
matters in a divorce, then the case would be inappropriate for CL. If
one party could not commit to negotiate in a collaborative way, that case
would not be appropriate for CL, and the like.
In this way, CL is markedly different from any other type of DR
process. In court and in arbitration, a neutral third party adjudicator
ensures the fairness of the process and ultimately decides the case. In
mediation, the system depends on the mediator to help ensure a fair
process, but ultimately, the court system is usually in the background to
deal with information exchange issues or motion practice. Dispute
settling negotiations are also conducted in the shadow of pending or
imminent litigation. CL, however, is based on the trust of the parties
and their lawyers to cooperatively engage in information exchange and
dispute resolution - and they promise not to use the safety-net of the
" Fairman, supra note 136, at 115.
141 UCLA § 15 & Prefatory Note.
"4 UCLA Prefatory Note.
147 UCLA § 15(a).
148 UCLA § 15(c).
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court, which makes the parties much more vulnerable than in other DR
processes.
Determining appropriateness should be done at the time of the
dispute - which makes PDCLAs problematic. At the time that the
parties sign a PDCLA, the parties do not know whether or not they could
resolve their dispute in a collaborative manner. In employment,
consumer, and professional (medical, legal, accounting, etc.) situations,
the parties likely would not even know each other, much less be able to
assess not only their own comfort with the CL process, but also the
likelihood that the other side would come to CL in good faith. Even in
cases where people know one another beforehand-in some
employment, professional, business, or even pre-nuptial situations-the
parties may overestimate the chances of the success of the relationship
and incorrectly assess how well they or the other party would utilize the
CL process. These two theoretical grounds of voluntariness and
appropriateness weigh heavily against enforcement of PDCLAs.
3. Necessity of Collaborative Lawyers
Collaborative Law requires collaborative lawyers. Even the
definition of collaborative law includes the important presence of
collaborative lawyers in the process.149 The necessity of collaborative
lawyers implicates two well-grounded policies in American law and
culture. The first is the right to have counsel of one's own choosing.
The second is the right to proceed pro se.
Although certainly not a law, the ability for clients to choose their
own lawyers is well engrained in the American culture. 15 0 The attorney-
... See, e.g., UCLA § 2(3) (" 'Collaborative law process' means a procedure intended
to resolve a collaborative matter without intervention by a tribunal in which persons...
are represented by collaborative lawyers."); Fairman, supra note 136, at 115
("Collaborative law is a procedure in which the parties and their lawyers agree to use the
best efforts and participate in good faith to resolve a dispute on an agreed basis without
resorting to judicial intervention") (emphasis added).
"So See, e.g., EnerSys Delaware, Inc. v. Hopkins, 401 S.C. 615, 618 (S.C. 2013)
(discussing the "importance of the party's right to counsel of his choice in an adversarial
system" and the "importance of the attorney-client relationship"); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 351
S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) ("[T]he Plaintiff herein, Katherine Hoyt had the
full opportunity to present and be represented by an attorney of her choosing in the divorce
proceeding and that her failure to do so was of her own choice."); Jones v. State, 926
S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("While a defendant in a criminal case may not
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client relationship is one of trust, and the ability of the client to choose
the lawyer should foster that relationship of trust and confidence.
Limitations exist, as well, such as financial limitations, 151 ethical
limitations, 152 as well as the necessity for the lawyer to agree to
undertake the representation.
153
PDCLAs potentially inhibit the right of clients to choose their own
lawyers because collaborative law relies on the use of a specific type of
lawyer-a lawyer willing to be collaborative. In some jurisdictions,
collaborative lawyers must also meet certain training requirements. 154
These requirements significantly limit the choice that clients usually
have in dispute resolution. Parties may already have an attorney-client
switch counsel at the last minute or do anything to manipulate or delay the trial through
his choice of counsel, he otherwise has an absolute right to choose his own attorney.");
Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Counsel of Choi e, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 525,
528-30 (2007) (discussing origins of right to counsel in the criminal law context).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Lii, 393 Fed. Appx. 498, 502 (9th Cir. 2010) ("At most
Lii was unable to proceed with a particular attorney of his choosing, a right that defendants
with appointed counsel do not possess."); State v. Anderson, 2016 Ohio 4651, 12 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 27, 2016) ("An indigent defendant does not have the right to choose a
particular attorney; rather, such a defendant 'has the right to professional, competent,
effective representation."); DeGroot v. State, 24 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
("DeGroot, of course, had.., the right to an attorney to defend him at trial, but it is well
established that like all defendants with court appointed lawyers, he had no right to choose
the attorney whom the court appoints.").
152 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 265 P.3d 342, 345 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011) ("A criminal
defendant is guaranteed the right to be represented by an attorney of their choosing if the
attorney is legally entitled to practice in that jurisdiction."); Garfinkel v. Mager, 57 So.3d
221,225 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing the conflict between the right to counsel of one's
choosing and the necessity for counsel free from conflicts, such as using confidential
information against an opponent).
153 See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent
Criminal Defendant: Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to
Counsel of Choice for the Indigent, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 181, 190 (1998) ("Thus, regardless
of the ability to pay, a criminal defendant may be denied representation by an attorney who
is unwilling to represent him.");
154 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC., R. 111.05(a) (2016) ("Collaborative law is a
process in which parties and their respective trained collaborative law attorneys and other
professionals contract in writing to resolve disputes without seeking court action other than
approval of a stipulated settlement."); Florida Court Order 2008-06, Order Authorizing
Collaborative Process Dispute Resolution Model in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida,
(2006) ("The collaborative conflict alterative [sic] resolution model is confidential and
utilizes interest based negotiation to resolve disputes through the structured assistance of
collaboratively trained professionals").
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relationship with an attorney who does not like the collaborative model
or whose personality or attorney philosophy is not compatible with the
process. For example, trial lawyers who rely on traditional tactics, such
as not sharing information unless formally asked, taking advantage of
technicalities, and engaging in competitive bargaining, would be
inappropriate for the collaborative process. Counsel limitations such as
these are not present in arbitration, mediation, or traditional negotiation,
although these tactics are not always wise in those processes. In this
respect, PDCLAs have the potential to limit clients' choice of counsel
in a way not seen before in ADR.
In addition to limiting client choice of attorneys, PDCLAs would
actually require parties to have attorneys because the definition of CL
involves represented parties.' 55 As a general matter, clients have a right
to proceed pro se, 156 whether or not that decision is wise. No other type
of dispute resolution mandates that the parties hire lawyers. Parties
commonly litigate, arbitrate, mediate, and negotiate pro se. Clients
choose (or "choose" depending on the circumstances) to be pro se for a
variety of reasons, including financial, inability to find a lawyer willing
to take the case, or simply out of a desire to pursue one's own case. CL
does not have an option for pro se parties, and a PDCLA would require
the parties to hire attorneys, which runs afoul of traditional dispute
resolution norms and customs.
4. Fee Structure
Today's CL lawyers are likely lawyers who work for hourly fees.
Most CL lawyers work in the area of domestic relations, and
contingency fees are strictly prohibited in divorce cases for ethical
reasons.1 57 Even in situations in which contingency fees are permitted
' See supra Section I(B).
16 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (establishing right to proceed
pro se in criminal cases); Johnstone v. Kelly, 808 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing
Faretta); Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423 (2007) (detailing a study
showing that pro se defendants have a similar conviction rate as represented parties and do
not overwhelmingly suffer from mental illness.).
"' MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.5(d) (AM. BAR. ASS'N, 1980) ("A lawyer
shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:(1) any fee in a domestic relations
matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or
upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof.")
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in domestic matters (such as collection of past-due child support), most
family lawyers build their practice on the hourly fee model. Lawyers
charging hourly-rate fees pose little issue in CL because the lawyers and
clients agree to pay the lawyer a traditional hourly fee based on work
actually conducted. If the case does not settle in CL, the parties will
still owe their CL attorneys the fees accrued on an hourly basis under
their engagement agreement.
If PDCLAs were utilized in areas where the contingency-fee model
is utilized, a practical question exists regarding the type of fee the
lawyer would charge. Plaintiff-side attorneys in employment and
consumer law often charge contingency fees. The contingency-fee
model allows cash-poor plaintiffs to hire lawyers with little or no money
down, and the attorney and client share the risk of a successful
settlement or outcome at trial. "8
Fewer problems would exist if a contingency-fee attorney takes a
CL case and the case settles in the process. The lawyer and client would
split the fee in the normal manner, as if it had settled prior to trial in a
traditional representation. On the other hand, if the case does not settle,
then the contingency lawyer would have to withdraw. The traditional
rule in cases of the withdrawal of a contingency fee attorney is that the
attorney is still due a fee, usually on a quantum meruit basis. 5 9 The
threat of withdrawal, however, would unduly pressure a contingency-
fee attorney to settle because the alternative would be that the attorney
would either not be paid at all or have to try to chase (or sue for) the fee
due. 160
.58 See, e.g., David Hricik, Dear Lawyer: If You Decide It's Not Economical to
Represent Me, You Can Fire Me As Your Contingent Fee Client, But I Agree I Will Still
Owe You A Fee, 64 MERCER L. REv. 363, 366 (2013) ("Contingent fees are permitted
because they are perceived to provide social utility. Among other things, they permit
clients who otherwise could not afford to hire a lawyer to obtain justice and pay the costs
out of any award from the opposing party. At the same time, they permit lawyers to earn a
living by bearing the risk of non-recovery for the client, but potentially obtaining recovery
if successful.")
1' Id at 364 (describing quantum meruit compensation in cases of attorney
withdrawal in a contingency case).
16 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppit, Lawyers Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional
Pluralism, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 475, 490- 541 (2005) (concluding that mandatory withdrawal
provisions would be problematic for contingency fee attorneys).
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At least one scholar argues that all collaborative lawyers - including
civil collaborative lawyers - represent clients in CL on an hourly
basis. 161 Paying hourly fees to traditional contingency lawyers may
actually encourage early settlement because the contingency fee model
seeks to compensate two distinct players - the client and the attorney.
162
If the lawyers were guaranteed an hourly fee, cases traditionally solved
through monetary means may also have additional room for non-
monetary options.
This solution, however, is unsatisfying for the reasons why
contingency fee agreements are available at all - notably access to
justice and the ability for cash-poor litigants to fmd representation.
With respect to PDCLAs, particularly in the area of consumer or
employment contracts, the contingency-fee conundrum only lends-an
additional argument against enforcement of these contracts.
5. Costs
The costs that the CL process imposes are potentially prohibitive.
Certainly, all PDAs impose costs. Arbitration costs include the costs of
the arbitrator, case management, and any attorneys who are hired to
work on the case. Mediation costs include the costs of the mediator as
well as any legal fees. Negotiation and traditional litigation costs are
those associated with attorneys - if any - that are hired to help on the
case. Certainly, all dispute resolution processes include non-monetary
costs, such as time, opportunity costs, and stress, to name a few. To
date, litigation, arbitration, and mediation have all found mechanisms
to help low-income participants. CL, on the other hand, is a potentially
costly dispute resolution system, with few innovations to date to curb
those expenses.
161 See Chih-Ming Liang, Rethinking the Tort Liability System and Patient Safety:
From the Conventional Wisdom to Learning from Litigation, 12 Ind. Health L. Rev. 327,
372 (2015) ("To encourage more trial lawyers to pursue early settlement would require the
participation of attorneys who are willing to charge hourly fees. Such a change may also
open the door for experimenting with collaborative law practices in the area of medical
malpractice.").
162 Karen Fasler, Show Me The Money!! The Potential For Cost Saving Associated
with a Parallel Program and Collaborative Law, 20 No. 2 Health Law. 15, 18 (Dec. 2007)
("Contingency fee arrangements skew negotiations toward more monetary solutions in
order to pay both attorney and plaintiff.").
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In traditional litigation, indigent parties can forgo the expense of
lawyers, and they can even have many of their fees waived (or other
protections) under informapauperis rules. 163 In traditional negotiation,
parties can negotiate pro se if they are concerned about the cost of hiring
lawyers. Otherwise, the processes have low monetary costs because the
court system is funded through public funds and because negotiation
does not involve extrinsic monetary obligations to third parties.
Arbitration has been criticized for being a costly dispute resolution
procedure, 164 yet the courts and private arbitration administrators have
placed limitations on these costs for indigent parties, particularly in
consumer and employment cases involving PDAAs. Arbitration costs
usually include the hourly rate of the arbitrator or arbitrators and any
fees paid to a provider organization, such as the American Arbitration
Association, for the costs of administering the case. 165 These costs can
be significant. On two occasions, the Supreme Court held that PDAAs
can be found unconscionable if a party - usually the plaintiff- cannot
afford the costs of the forum. 166 In addition, arbitration providers now
163 See generally, Ben C. Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 Stan. L.
Rev. 1270 (1966) (discussing history and evolution of protections for indigent parties in
litigation); Jon MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361
(1923) (discussing historical protections for indigent parties in civil litigation in England
and the United States and making suggestions for the future for United States' courts).
" See, e.g., Michelle Eviston & Richard Bales, Capping the Costs of Consumer and
Employment Arbitration, 42 U. Tol. L. Rev. 903, 903 (2011) (Agreements requiring
arbitration but imposing costs of thousands of dollars can effectively make it impossible
for consumers and employees to bring their disputes in any forum."); Mark E. Budnitz,
The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 133, 135-
44 (2004) (detailing the costs of arbitration and giving examples from specific cases);
Murray L. Smith, Costs in International Commercial Arbitration, 56 Disp. Resol. J. 30
(Apr. 2001) (outlining costs in international arbitration cases); Lisa Bernstein,
Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed
Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169, 2199-2201 (1993) (an early look at costs
of arbitration and the effect of costs on the potential settlement of claims prior to
arbitration).
165 See Blankley & Weston, supra note 79, at §7.06[C].
"6 In 2000, the Supreme Court held that prohibitive costs may prevent a party from
vindicating important statutory rights in the arbitral forum. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. V.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) ("It may well be that the existence of large arbitration
costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum."). The burden, however, is on the party seeking to
invalidate an arbitration agreement to show that the costs are prohibitive. Id. In 2013, the
Supreme Court clarified that the Randolph decision is limited to cases in which the parties
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have affordable fees for parties such as consumers and employees.
167
Whether the law and arbitration providers are going far enough to aid
indigent arbitration parties is outside of the scope of this Article. That
said, there are some measures in place to aid low-income parties in
accessing the forum.
In contrast, mediation is rarely criticized for being too expensive.
Often, it is touted as a considerably affordable type of dispute resolution
procedure. 168 Compared to a fully- litigated case, a successful
mediation is likely significantly less costly in terms of time and attorney
expenses. 169 Compared to traditional negotiation, mediation may be of
a similar or higher cost, due to the necessity to hire a mediator.1 70 Many
communities have community mediation centers that provide quality
mediation services for free or for reduced fees to ensure access to
mediation services. 171 In addition, law school clinics now also offer
cannot afford the costs of the forum - such as the arbitrator's fees and administrative fees.
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (holding
that the Randolph rule "would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable"). The Italian
Colors decision, however, failed to extend the Randolph rule to other costs associated with
the case, including the expense of expert witnesses. Id. at 2312.
167 See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, Consumer Arbitration Rules, Costs of
Arbitration (capping the fees for a consumer at $200 and placing the additional burden of
arbitration costs - up to $1,500 per hearing day - on the business involved); American
Arbitration Association, Employment Arbitration Rules, Costs of Arbitration (employing
a similar fee structure for employment arbitration).
168 James A. Wall & Kyle R. Holley, Mediation's Effects: Test, Don't Guess 7 T.B.
on Arb. & Mediation 117, 128 (2015) (using empirical data to show that mediation is less
costly than a case that goes to trial); Michael Newman & Faith Isenhath, Effective
Negotiation Practices and Strategies, 58 Fed. Law. 16,17 (Feb. 2011) ("Mediation, which
is often much less costly and less time-consuming than litigating employment disputes,
can be pursued at numerous times throughout the litigation process.").
169 Of course, the issue of costs is complex, particularly when the mediation is
unsuccessful. A fully-litigated case will be more expensive if the parties had an
unsuccessful mediation during the course of the litigation.
'7 0 See Katherine Doornik, A Rationale for Mediation and its Optimal Use, 38 Int'l
Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 5 (2014) (describing that in some instances mediation will be
theoretically less costly than traditional dispute resolution, but that in other instances, the
costs may be the same or even more expensive compared to negotiation); Scott Sigmund
Garter, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail But Actually Succeeds, 2 Penn
St. J. L. & Int'l Aff. 27, 29 (2013) (discussing costs of mediation in international disputes,
focusing on non-monetary and opportunity costs).
171 In 2014-15, 1 had the pleasure of serving as the Chair of the American Bar
Association Section of Dispute Resolution Access to Justice Task Force. This Task Force
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mediation services. 172 Court connected programs, such as "settlement
days" and "settlement weeks" also provide low-cost or no-cost
options.' 73 Perhaps, courts are willing to compel mediation and enforce
PDMAs as conditions precedent because of the multitude of low-cost
mediation options available.
Collaborative law, perhaps because it is a new procedure, and
perhaps because of how it is structured, has not yet developed low-cost
options for indigent parties. A Texas family law practitioner eloquently
compared the costs of CL and the costs of mediation:
Probably the most important difference between
mediation and collaborative law is the variation in cost
between these two methods of ADR. Whereas litigation
is clearly the most expensive option to resolve a legal
dispute, ADR methods are generally much less
expensive; thus, parties often choose ADR because of
serious concerns about the expense of a family lawsuit.
However, what is not highly advertised about
collaborative law is that, in its system of many meetings
and agreements, it is often substantially more expensive
than mediation, as somewhat indicated by the fact that it
is generally utilized only in households that have a
relatively high annual income. Mediation is by far the
least expensive option of all methods of ADR; even
when the parties involved do not finalize all issues in
their cases, mediating those issues is still less expensive
than litigating them in court.
While one attorney-mediator estimates the cost of an
average collaborative divorce as reaching around
authored a 20-page white paper on the intersection of access to justice and ADR, and it
specifically discussed community mediation and reduce-fee services available for clients
across the country. See American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution Task
Force on Access to Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Access to Justice Through
Alternative Dispute Resolution White Paper, 2-4,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/dispute-resolution/publications/A
2J %20white paper.pdf
172 Id at 4-5.
17 3 Id. at 3-4.
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$17,600.1, the cost of mediating that divorce is thought
to be between approximately $2,000 and $5,000 for a
full mediation in which the parties resolve all of the
contentious issues of their case. Since so much time in a
collaborative suit is spent on setting up the mechanism
of collaboration itself, drafting agreements, explaining
the process, talking about the process, and arranging
appointments that all four people are able to attend at the
same time, collaborative law is generally more
expensive.
174
CL is an extensive and time-intensive process using a significant
amount of lawyer services, so it is not surprising that it is expensive.
And in many cases, the expenses are probably well worth the cost.
However, the costs may or may not be known to parties who sign a
PDCLA. Just as a PDAA is unenforceable if one of the parties cannot
avail himself of the process, a PDCLA should similarly be
unenforceable if one of the parties cannot afford the process, notably
the required presence of CL counsel. This factor is yet another one that
leans against the enforcement of PDCLAs.
6. Potential Abuse of the Collaborative Law Process
Finally, unethical parties may abuse the CL process, and this abuse
may increase if parties are required to engage in CL. This practical
concern is an outgrowth of the theoretical concerns of voluntariness and
appropriateness. A party forced to participate in collaborative law may
abuse the process or simply not participate in good faith or in the spirit
of collaborative law. Because the requirements of openness and
disclosure rely on the good faith participation of the attorneys and
parties, one party may voluntarily disclose while the other side hides
key information. The hidden information may never be disclosed, or it
may only be disclosed in litigation following an unsuccessful CL
process. Of course, this concern is present in any CL process; but this
174 Elizabeth F. Beyer, A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative Law as
Alternatives to Family Law Litigation, 40 St. Mary's L.J. 303, 326-27 (2008) (citations
omitted); see also Lande, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 24, at 17-18 (discussing costs
of collaborative law).
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worry is amplified if inappropriate parties or counsel begin to
participate in the process with bad intentions.171
7. A Potential Exception - PDCLAs in CL Agreements
Despite the general problems with PDCLAs, an exception might be
made for "re-CL" agreements - or agreements to return to CL in a CL
settlement. Remediation clauses are typical in mediation agreements.
Parties often include a remediation clause if they are satisfied with the
mediation process and want to return to it for problems in the future. 1 76
The same may be true for parties in collaborative law. Parties who
voluntarily choose CL may very well want to return to CL if they find
the process successful the first time around. The parties may even wish
to designate the type of disputes they would submit to collaborative law,
such as modifications to the collaborative settlement or enforcement
issues. Although re-CL agreements might seem particularly well-suited
to family disputes, the concept of a re-CL clause may also be enticing
to other types of civil collaborative law settlements.
If the parties have a re-CL clause, they are already fully aware of
the risks and costs of the process - at least how they relate to the first
dispute. They would have already hired attorneys for the first CL
process and would expect to hire attorneys again. They would already
know the process and how it works. Having gone through the process
once, the parties may have a better sense of the types of disputes CL
would help them resolve.
Despite these benefits, not every party will want to use the
collaborative process again. As Professor Lande found in his research,
not all parties are satisfied with the collaborative process, particularly
175See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-
Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 69 (2002)
(discussing design process to lesson abusive behavior in the mediation process); Roger L.
Carter, Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns, and Commentary on Efforts to
Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 367 (2002) (discussing
cases of bad faith in mediation and solutions for the problem of bad faith).
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with respect to costs and time.177 For instance, the relationship between
the parties may have deteriorated over time. Divorced parents might
have an amicable relationship while both parties are still single, only to
see that relationship sour after one or both of the parents re-marries. In
any case, a breach of a settlement agreement would likely lead to a loss
of trust between the parties, and trust is essential to the process.
The UCLA has a provision that allows for the enforcement of
agreements reached in the CL process. Under Section 20(b), a "tribunal
may ... enforce an agreement evidenced by a record resulting from the
process in which the parties participated."' 17 8 Presumably, this section
is intended to enforce the merits of an agreement reached in
collaborative law. However, the language is not so specific and could
certainly reach a re-CL agreement. If one party could no longer afford
an attorney, this Article would suggest enforcing the CL agreement in
this situation, but allow one or both of the parties to proceed pro se.
Perhaps the best practice in this arena would be to ask the parties to
affirm their desire to engage in a second collaborative process.
Requiring the parties to affirm their commitment to the process was the
approach recently adopted in the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Law.
Under that Act, "An agreement to arbitrate a child-related dispute that
arises between the parties after the agreement is made is unenforceable
unless: (1) the parties affirm the agreement in a record after the dispute
arises." 179 The purpose of this provision is to ensure true voluntariness
in arbitrating child-related matters. Requiring the parties to reaffirm
their desire to engage in collaborative law would satisfy any concerns
about voluntariness.
8. Include a PDCLA in a Contract Despite Questionable
Enforceability?
Despite this Article's overarching recommendation that PDCLAs
not be enforced, parties may still wish to include these clauses for two
reasons, one practical and one educational. The practical reason is that
the parties may decide to give CL a chance, even if they might not have
177 John Lande, An Empirical Analysis of Collaborative Practice, 49 Fam. Ct. Rev.
257, 18-19 (2011) (discussing empirical research on collaborative law, reporting studies
showing costs of the process from $8,000 to $23,000 per case).
178 Uniform Collaborative Law Act §20(b)(1).
179 Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act §5(c)(1).
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considered it otherwise. Some practitioners recommend a similar
strategy with respect to mediation - that the PDMA would at least get
the parties to the table to try the process. 180 A PDCLA could serve that
same purpose. The parties, after considering the dispute and the
process, could reaffirm in writing their desire to engage in the
collaborative process, thus removing any doubts about the voluntariness
of the process. Parties who do not want to participate could simply
proceed with a different process.
The second goal is educational. CL is a new process and certainly
not a household term yet. A PDCLA could give parties - particularly
employees and consumers - an option that they either would not have
known about or would not have discovered on their own. Even if not
enforceable, these types of agreements might serve an important
educational purpose and give parties a new option that they might not
have otherwise considered.
IV. CONCLUSION
Collaborative law is a new and promising form of dispute resolution
and its advantages may motivate some parties - particularly businesses
- to include PDCLAs in standard contracts. Despite these advantages,
drawbacks about the process make enforcing a PDCLA problematic.
The disputes might not be appropriate for CL, the parties might not enter
CL voluntarily, and the costs of the process may be prohibitive. The
weight of the argument leads to the conclusion that PDCLAs should not
be enforced over the objection of one or more parties. Notwithstanding
this conclusion, PDCLAs might serve an important practical and
educational purpose and might lead more parties to choose CL willingly
and voluntarily.
608
180 See, e.g., 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Guide § 25:1 (2016) ("A pre-
dispute mediation clause, however, is often extremely valuable to the parties since it
ensures that the parties will at least come to the table and give the process a chance.").
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